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ABSTRACT 
 
Fuzzy Set Theory has been applied in many 
fields such as Operations Research, Control 
Theory, and Management Sciences etc. In 
particular, an application of this theory in 
Managerial Decision Making Problems has a 
remarkable significance. In this Paper, we 
consider a solution of Rectangular Fuzzy 
game with pay-off as imprecise numbers 
instead of crisp numbers viz., interval and 
LR-type Trapezoidal Fuzzy Numbers. The 
solution of such Fuzzy games with pure 
strategies by minimax-maximin principle is 
discussed. The Algebraic Method to 
solve 22 Fuzzy games without saddle point 
by using mixed strategies is also illustrated. 
Here, nm pay-off matrix is reduced to 
22 pay-off matrix by Dominance Method. 
This fact is illustrated by means of Numerical 
Example. 
 
Keywords Interval Number, LR-type Trapezoidal 
Fuzzy Number, Fuzzy game, Dominance. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of Game Theory [1, 2] is 
defined as a body of knowledge that deals 
with making decisions when two or more 
intelligent and rational opponents are 
involved under conditions of conflict and 
competition. In practical life, it is required to 
take decisions in a competing situation when 
there are two or more opposite teams with 
conflicting interests and the outcome is 
controlled by the decisions of all parties 
concerned. Such problems occur frequently 
in Economics, Business Administration, 
Sociology, Political Science and Military 
Operations [2]. In all the above problems of 
different Sciences where the competitive 
situations are involved, one acts in a rational 
manner and tries to resolve the conflict of 
interests in his favour. It is in this context 
that the Game Theory can prove a useful 
decision making tool. Instead of making 
inferences from the past behavior of the 
opponent, the approach of Game Theory is 
to seek to determine a rival’s most profitable 
counter strategy to one’s own best moves 
and formulate the appropriate defensive 
measures. For Example, if two firms are 
locked up in a war to maintain their market 
share, then a price-out by the first firm will 
invite reaction from the second firm in the 
nature of a price-cut. This will, in turn, 
affect the sales and profits of the first firm 
which will again have to develop a counter 
strategy to meet the challenge from the 
second firm. The game will thus go on until 
one of the firms emerges as winner. 
 
The mathematical treatment of the Game 
Theory was made available in 1944, when 
John Von Newmann and Oscar Morgenstern 
published the famous article Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior [2]. The 
Von Newmann’s approach to solve the 
Game Theory problems was based on the 
principle of best out of the worst i.e., he 
utilized the idea of minimization of the 
maximum losses. Most of the competitive 
problems can be handled by this principle. 
However, in real life situations, the 
information available is of imprecise nature 
and there is an inherent degree of vagueness 
or uncertainty present in the system under 
consideration. In order to tackle this 
uncertainty the concept of Fuzzy Sets can be 
used as an important decision making tool. 
Imprecision here is meant in the sense of 
vagueness rather than the lack of knowledge 
about the parameters present in the system. 
The Fuzzy Set Theory thus provides a strict 
mathematical framework in which vague 
conceptual phenomena can be precisely and 
rigorously studied. 
 
In this work, we have concentrated on the 
solution of Rectangular Games by Principle 
of Dominance Using LR-type Trapezoidal 
Fuzzy Numbers. The LR-type Trapezoidal 
Fuzzy Numbers are defined by the 
Trapezoidal Membership Functions. They 
are characterized by their simple 
formulations and computational efficiency 
and thus have been used extensively to solve 
different problems in Engineering and 
Management. The solution of Fuzzy games 
with Pay-off as imprecise number is 
generally given by the minimax-maximin 
Principle. In the past, work has also been 
done on Algebraic Method of solving 
nm Rectangular Fuzzy games with Pay-
off as Interval Numbers having no Saddle 
Point. Determination of 22 Fuzzy games 
from a Rectangular nm Fuzzy game 
without Saddle Point is a fundamental 
problem of Fuzzy Game Theory. In 
Classical Game Theory the Pay-off is a 
Crisp Number. Practically, it may happen 
that Pay-off is not necessarily a fixed real 
number. Here, the Pay-off is considered as 
LR-type Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number and the 
nm matrix is reduced to 22 matrix. The 
Organization of this Paper is as follows. In 
section 2, we define the Trapezoidal 
Membership Function. In the next section, 
we consider the concept of the Interval 
Numbers. In the section 4, we give the basic 
definitions of the Two Person Zero Sum 
Games and the Pay-off Matrix. The section 
5 discusses Solution of 22 Games with 
mixed strategies. In the next section, we 
discuss about Games having no Saddle 
Point. The section 7 illustrates the Concept 
of Dominance. This is followed by a 
Simulation Example. Finally, in section 8 
conclusions are given. 
 
2. TRAPEZOIDAL MEMBERSHIP 
FUNCTION 
 
A trapezoidal membership function is 
defined by four parameters viz., dcba ,,, as 
follows [3] 
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3. INTERVAL NUMBERS 
 
An interval number [4] is defined 
as },:{],[  xXxXxXXI RLRL . 
Another way of representing an interval 
number in terms of midpoint is, 
 )(),( iwimI  where, )(im  midpoint 
of 2/)( RL XXI  and )(iw  half 
width of 2/)( RL XXI  . Addition of 
two interval numbers ],[ RL XXI  and 
],[ RL YYJ   is ],[ RRLL YXYXJI  . 
Using mean width notations, if 
 11 , wmI and  22 , wmJ then
 2121 , wwmmJI . Similarly, 
the other binary operations on interval 
numbers are defined [4]. 
 
3.1 ORDERED RELATION AMONG 
INTERVALS 
 
If ],[ baI  , ],[ dcJ   then ],[],[ dcba  , 
iff cb   and is denoted by JI  . I is 
contained in J iff ca  , db  and this is 
denoted by JI  . 
 
Definition 1 The dominated index )(DI to 
proposition I  is dominated over 
J as )/()()( 2112 wwmmJII  . 
 
Using DI the following ranking order is 
defined. 
 
Definition 2 If 1)(  JIDI , then I is 
said to be totally dominating over J in the 
sense of minimization and J is said to be 
totally dominating over J in the sense of 
minimization. This is denoted by JI  . 
 
Definition 3 If 1)(0  JIDI , then I is 
said to be partially dominating over J in the 
sense of minimization and J is said to be 
partially dominating over J in the sense of 
minimization. This is denoted by JI  . 
 
When 0)(  JIDI , then 21 mm  , it may 
be emphasized on the width of interval 
numbers I and J. If 21 ww  , then left end 
point of I is less than that of J and there is 
a chance that on finding a minimum 
distance, the distance may be on I . But at 
the same time, since the right end point of 
I is greater than that of J , if one prefers 
I over J in minimization then in worst case, 
he may be looser than one who prefer 
J over I . 
 
Numerical Example: 
 
 5,115]120,110[I , ]155,150[J
 5.2,5.152 , 5.152()(  JIDI
12/)115  . So in minimization I is 
totally dominating over J . 
 
Definition 4 The dominated index )(DI  of 
proposition ),,(  aA  is dominated 
over ),,(  bB  is given by  )( BADI  
)/()(   ab . Using DI  index the 
following ranking order is defined. 
 
Definition 5 If 1)(  BADI , A is said to 
be totally dominating over B in the sense of 
minimization and B is said to be totally 
dominating over A  in the sense of 
maximization, it is also denoted by BA  . 
 
Definition 6 If 1)(0  BADI , then 
A is said to be partially dominating over 
B in the sense of minimization and B is said 
to be partially dominating over A in the 
sense of maximization, it is also denoted 
by BA  . 
 
Lemma1:If 0)(  BADI then A and B are 
said to be non comparable and is denoted 
by BA  . In this case A is preferred 
over B if (a)   and   or (b) 
  and   , otherwise a pessimistic 
decision maker would prefer the number 
with smaller length of support whereas an 
optimistic decision maker would do the 
converse. 
 
Numerical Example:  
 
(1)If  2.0,6A ,  2.0,1B then ADI (
1)2.02.0/()16()  B . Thus, A  is 
totally dominating over B in the sense of 
minimization and B is said to be totally 
dominating over A  in the sense of 
maximization.  
 
(2)If  5.0,4.0A ,  5.0,3.0B then
1.0)5.05.0/()3.04.0()(  BADI  
1.0)5.05.0/()3.04.0()(  BADI . So, 
A is said to be partially dominating over B . 
 
4. TWO PERSON ZERO SUM GAMES 
AND PAY-OFF MATRIX 
 
In this section we give some basic 
definitions of the Two Person Zero Sum 
Games and pay-off matrix. These concepts 
form the basic building blocks of Game 
Theory. 
 
4.1 TWO PERSON ZERO SUM GAMES 
 
A game of two persons in which gains of 
one player are losses of other player is called 
a two person zero sum game, i.e., in two 
person zero sum the algebraic sum of gains 
to both players after a play is bound to be 
zero. Games relating to pure strategies taken 
by players are considered here based on two 
assumptions [1, 2] 
 
1. Player A is in better position and is 
called maximization player (or row 
player) and player B is called 
minimizing player (or column player). 
 
2. Total gain of one player is exactly 
equal to total loss of other player. In 
general, if player A  takes m pure 
strategies and B takes n pure strategies, 
then the game is called two person zero 
sum game or nm rectangular game. 
 
4.2 PAY-OFF MATRIX 
 
Two person zero sum games are known as 
rectangular games since they are 
represented by rectangular pay-off matrix. A 
pay-off matrix is always written for 
maximizing player. Considering the general 
nm  rectangular game, the pay-off matrix 
of A with m  pure 
strategies mAA .,,.........1 and B with n pure 
strategies nBB .,,.........1 is given by [3], 
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The elements  ijij ba , are LR-type 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers and for crisp 
game they may be positive, negative or zero. 
When player A chooses strategy iA and 
player B selects jB , it results in pay-off of 
LR-type trapezoidal fuzzy number 
 ijij ba , to player A . 
 
5. SOLUTION OF 22 GAMES WITH 
MIXED STRATEGIES 
 
Consider the fuzzy game [3, 5] of players A 
(strategies represented horizontally) and B 
(strategies represented vertically) whose 
pay-off is given by following matrix and for 
which there is no saddle point. 
 










2222
1212
2121
1111
,
,
,
,
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where, pay-off  ijij ba , are symmetric 
LR-type trapezoidal fuzzy numbers such 
that  ijij ab . If ix and jy be the 
probabilities by which A  chooses 
thi strategy and B chooses thj strategy then: 
 
)/()( 2112221121221 aaaaaax  ;  
);/()( 2112221121221 aaaaaay   
)/()( 2112221112112 aaaaaax  ;  
);/()( 2112221112112 aaaaaay   
 
which are crisp numbers and value of the 
game can be easily computed as 
 baV , ; where, a and b are left and 
right spreads of LR-type trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers given by: 
 
)/()( 2112221121122211 aaaaaaaaa  ;  
)/()( 2112221121122211 bbbbbbbbb   
 
6. GAMES WITH NO SADDLE POINT 
 
The simplest case is a 22 Fuzzy game 
with no saddle point. Here, we consider a 
nm Fuzzy game. Now we discuss a 
particular method. In this method, the pay-
off can be reduced to 22 games so that it 
can be solved by using the Fuzzy game 
method. The method of reduction of the pay-
off matrix by this process is called the 
Dominance property [1, 2] of the rows and 
columns of the pay-off matrix. 
 
 
 
7. CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE 
 
If one pure strategy of a player is better for 
him or as good as another, for all possible 
pure strategies of opponent then first is said 
to dominate the second [1, 2]. The 
dominated strategy can simply be discarded 
from pay-off matrix since it has no value. 
When this is done, optimal strategies for the 
reduced matrix are also optimal for the 
original matrix with zero probability for 
discarded strategies. When there is no saddle 
point in pay-off matrix, then size of the 
game can be reduced by dominance, before 
the problem is solved.  
 
Definition 7 If all elements of the thi row of 
pay-off matrix of a nm rectangular game 
are dominating over thr row in the sense of 
maximization, thr row is discarded and 
deletion of thr row from matrix does not 
change the set of optimal strategies of 
maximizing player. 
 
Numerical Example Consider the fuzzy 
game of two players A (strategies 
represented horizontally) and B (strategies 
represented vertically) with the following 
pay-off matrix. Player A is maximizing 
player and player B is minimizing player. 
 













2.0,62.0,12.0,0
3.0,71.0,22.0,6
1.0,23.0,72.0,1
 
 
1)2.02.0/()06()( 2131  AADI  
1)2.04.0/()12()( 2232  AADI  
1)2.03.0/()67()( 2131  AADI  
 
Thus 2A is dominating over 3A in the sense of 
maximization and row 3A  is deleted. The 
reduced matrix is given by, 
 
 









3.0,7
1.0,2
1.0,22.0,6
3.0,72.0,1
 
 
Definition 8 If all elements of thj column 
are dominating over ths column in the sense 
of minimization the ths column is deleted and 
the deletion of ths column from the matrix 
does not change the set of optimal strategies 
of minimizing player.  
 
Numerical Example  
 
Considering the above pay-off matrix,   
 
1)3.01.0/()12()( 1311  BBDI  
1)3.02.0/()67()( 2321  BBDI  
 
Here 1B is totally dominating over 3B in the 
sense of minimization and the resultant pay-
off matrix is given by,  
 










1.0,2
3.0,7
2.0,6
2.0,1
 
 
Definition 9 If the linear combination 
of thp and thq rows dominates all elements 
of the ths row in the sense of minimization, 
ths  row is discarded and the deletion of ths  
row from matrix does not change the set of 
optimal strategies of maximizing player.  
 
Numerical Example Considering a 
particular pay-off matrix of two players A 
(strategies represented horizontally) and B 
(strategies represented vertically) as follows: 
 













4.0,24.0,32.0,1
2.0,23.0,15.0,3
1.0,11.0,24.0,1
 
 
The convex combination of second and third 
row gives 10;)1( 334   AAA . 
Taking 5.0 the elements 
of 4A are  35.0,1 ,  35.0,2 and  30.0,2  
Now 4A is dominating over 1A in the sense of 
maximization and row 1A is discarded such 
that the resulting pay-off matrix is given by,  
 








4.0,24.0,32.0,1
2.0,23.0,15.0,3
 
 
Definition 10  If thj column is dominated by 
the convex combination of thm and 
thn column, thj column is discarded in sense 
of minimization and deletion of thj column 
from matrix does not change the set of 
optimal strategies of the minimizing player.  
 
Numerical Example  
 
Considering above pay-off matrix, the 
convex combination of 1B and 2B  i.e., 
10;)1( 214   BBB .  
 
Taking 5.0  elements of 4B are,  
 








3.0,1
4.0,2
 
 
Now 4B is totally dominating over 3B and 
thus the third column is removed such that 
the resulting matrix is given by,  
 








3.0,12.0,1
4.0,35.0,3
 
 
Definition 11 When there is no saddle point 
and no course of action dominates any other 
the values for different 22 sub games are 
computed. As A  is maximizing player he 
will definitely select that pair strategies 
which will give the best value of 22 sub 
games and the corresponding sub matrix 
provides optimal solution. Similarly, B is 
minimizing player he will definitely select 
that pair of courses, which will give the least 
value of 22 sub games, the corresponding 
sub matrix will provide optimal solution to 
the fuzzy problem. 
 
Numerical Example  
 
Consider the fuzzy game whose pay-off 
matrix is given by, 
 








4.0,54.0,202.0,0
1.0,164.0,152.0,19
 
 
There is no saddle point and no course of 
action dominates any other. The values 1V , 
2V , 3V are computed from the following 
three 22 sub games as obtained from given 
matrix. 
 
Sub game 1: 







4.0,202.0,0
4.0,152.0,19
;  
The corresponding value 
5
7,
6
95
1V .  
 
Sub game 2: 







4.0,52.0,0
1.0,162.0,19
; 
 The corresponding value  1.0,162V .  
 
Sub game 3: 







4.0,54.0,20
1.0,164.0,15
; 
The corresponding value 
5
11,
16
245
3V . 
  
Here, 3321 },,min{ VVVV  such the 
resulting pay-off matrix is:  
 








4.0,54.0,20
1.0,164.0,15
 
 
8. NUMERICAL SIMULATION  
 
To illustrate dominance method, we 
consider the following pay-off matrix: 













4.0,55.0,152.0,203.0,0
1.0,164.0,175.0,151.0,19
4.0,21.0,44.0,153.0,8
 
 
All 1)( 21  AADI , so 2A is totally 
dominating over 1A in the sense of 
minimization and row 1A is deleted, such 
that the resulting pay-off matrix is: 
 








4.0,55.0,152.0,203.0.0
1.0,164.0,175.0,151.0,19
             
Again all 1)( 34  BBDI , so 4B is totally 
dominating over 3B in the sense of 
minimization and the column 3B is deleted 
such that the resulting pay-off matrix is: 
 








4.0,52.0,203.0.0
1.0,165.0,151.0,19
 
 
This is no course of action which dominates 
any other and there is no saddle point. The 
values for different 22 pair of strategies 
are computed. Since, B is minimizing 
player the minimum value is considered and 
corresponding pay-off matrix provides 
optimal solution to fuzzy problem. The 
previous least value of },,{ 321 VVV is 3V so 
optimal strategies of A are ),( 32 AA  and 
of B are ),( 32 BB . The final pay-off matrix 
is given by, 
 








4.0,52.0,20
1.0,165.0,15
 
 
The probabilities are 
16
15,0
,
16
1,0,
16
1,
16
15,0
43
21321


yy
yyxxx
and value of the game is 
5
11,
16
245V . 
Hence, optimal solution of the complete 
game is ),,0( 32 xx  for A and 
),0,,0( 42 yy for B ; the value of game 
beingV . 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
We considered the solution of Rectangular 
Fuzzy games using LR-type Trapezoidal 
Fuzzy Numbers. Here pay-off is considered 
as imprecise numbers instead of crisp 
numbers which takes care of the uncertainty 
and vagueness inherent in such problems. 
LR-type Trapezoidal Fuzzy Numbers are 
used because of their simplicity and 
computational efficiency. We discuss 
solution of Fuzzy games with pure strategies 
by minimax-maximin principle and also 
Algebraic Method to solve 22 Fuzzy 
games without saddle point by using mixed 
strategies. The Concept of Dominance 
Method is also illustrated. LR-type 
Trapezoidal Fuzzy Numbers generates 
optimal solutions which are feasible in 
nature and also takes care of the 
impreciseness aspect.  
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